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Thursday, December 31, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Johnson et al LEBOVITZ 112(1) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY

“To satisfy the written description requirement in the case of a chemical or biotechnological genus, more than a statement of the genus is normally required. One must show that one has possession, as described in the application, of sufficient species to show that he or she invented and disclosed the totality of the genus.” Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. , 541 F.3d 1115, 1126 (2008).

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Mizushima et al SMITH 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.

To anticipated Appellants’ claimed invention, a reference must lead one of ordinary skill in the art to a product which falls within the scope of the claim "without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference." In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972).

Ex Parte Ramsden et al COLAIANNI 103(a) Carestream Health, Inc.

As stated in In re Rinehart,


When prima facie obviousness is established and evidence is submitted in
rebuttal, the decision-maker must start over. Though the burden of going forward
to rebut the prima facie case remains with the applicant, the question of
whether that burden has been successfully carried requires that the entire path
to decision be retraced. An earlier decision should not, as it was here, be
considered as set in concrete, and applicant's rebuttal evidence then be
evaluated only on its knockdown ability. Analytical fixation on an earlier
decision can tend to provide that decision with an undeservedly broadened
umbrella effect. Prima facie obviousness is a legal conclusion, not a fact.
Facts established [sic] by rebuttal evidence must be evaluated along with the
facts on which the earlier conclusion was reached, not against the conclusion
itself.

531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (CCPA 1976).


Rinehart, In re, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2107.02, 2142, 2143.02, 2144.04

Ex Parte Tsuzaki et al SMITH 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.

Ex Parte Hannington DELMENDO 101/112(1) HEIDI A. BOEHLEFELD RENNER, OTTO, BOISELLE & SKLAR, LLP

“[T]he PTO has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure.” In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, it is “[o]nly after the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted utility.” Id.

Brana, In re, 51 F.3d 1560, 34 USPQ2d1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . .2106, 2107.01, 2107.03, 2164.01(c) , 2107.02, 2164.02, 2164.04, 2164.07

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Friauf et al COURTENAY 103(a) DALE F. REGELMAN QUARLES & BRADY, LLP


Invention or discovery is the requirement which constitutes the foundation of
the right to obtain a patent . . . unless more ingenuity and skill were required
in making or applying the said improvement than are possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there is an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute the essential elements of every invention.

Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 197 (1876) (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850))

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Sakata HOFF 102(e)/103(a) MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Kasiviswanathan et al MOHANTY 102(e) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY







Wednesday, December 30, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Ross et al MILLS Concurring McCOLLUM 103(a) INSKEEP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP, INC

If when combined, the references "would produce a seemingly inoperative device," then they teach away from their combination. In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 587 (CCPA 1969); see also, In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding no suggestion to modify a prior art device where the modification would render the device inoperable for its intended purpose).

Sponnoble, In re, 405 F.2d 578, 160 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . 2141.02

Gordon, In re, 733 F.2d 900, 221 USPQ 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . .2143.01, 2144.08

A proposed modification or combination of the prior art that would change the basic principles under which the prior art invention was designed to operate weighs against a conclusion of prima facie obviousness. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959).


Ratti, In re, 270 F.2d 810, 123 USPQ 349 (CCPA 1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2143.01

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

Ex Parte Ribarich MARTIN 103(a) FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Daoud et al BARRETT 102(e)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Brod ADAMS 112(2)/112(1)/103(a) FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P

[W]e note that working examples are not required to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (CCPA 1982).

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Hsu et al SAADAT 112(1)/103(a) THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C. - IBM

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Conaway et al HORNER 102(b)/103(a) ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT

In other words, “[t]he patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production.” SmithKline, 439 F.3d at 1317.

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 74 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2112

However, if the words of limitation can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process used to obtain it, then the limitation is commonly interpreted in its structural sense. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp. , 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“[E]ven words of limitation that can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their structural sense….”); Hazani v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Com’n. , 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that claims to a plate having a “chemically engraved” surface are best characterized as pure product claims, since the “chemically engraved” limitation, read in context, describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 278-79 (CCPA 1969)(noting that past-tense verbs such as “ ‘intermixed,’ ‘ground in place,’ ‘press fitted,’ ‘etched,’ and ‘welded,’ all … at one time or another have been separately held capable of construction as structural, rather than process, limitations.”).

Garnero, In re, 412 F.2d 276, 162 USPQ 221 (CCPA 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2113

Friday, December 25, 2009

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Sherwood GARRIS 112(1)/103(a) FREILICH, HORNBAKER & ROSEN

Thursday, December 24, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Logtenberg SCHEINER 112(1) TRASKBRITT, P.C.

“The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not.” Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. , 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 57 USPQ2d 1449 (D. Mass. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706.04

Ex Parte Moreland et al ADAMS 102(b)/103(a) BUTZEL LONG

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Phillips COLAIANNI 102(b)/103(a) MCNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC

Ex Parte Boronkay et al FRANKLIN 102(b)/103(a) TOWNSEND AND TOWNSEND AND CREW, LLP

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security

Ex Parte Work BARRETT 102(b)/103(a) SONNENSCHEIN NATH & ROSENTHAL LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Rhoads FETTING 112(2)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) DIGIMARC CORPORATION

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Yang et al MILLS 102(e)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A.

The claims are not to be confined to the embodiments found in the Specification, and it is improper to import limitations from the Specification into the claims. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. , 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Trans Texas Holdings Corp., In re, 498 F.3d 1290, 83 USPQ2d 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2286, 2686.04

As set forth in In re Hiniker Co. , 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), "[t]he name of the game is the claim."

Hiniker Co., In re, 150 F.3d 1362, 47 USPQ2d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . .
2106, 2242, 2258, 2258.01, 2642

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Nadooshan et al HAIRSTON 101/102(b)/103(a) AVAYA DEMONT & BREYER, LLC

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Romanczyk et al LANE 103(a) NADA JAIN, P.C.

Though an inherent property need not have been known in the prior art to establish anticipation, when an inherent property is relied upon as a reason to combine references, the property must have been known in the art. See In re Newell, 891 F.2d 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“a retrospective view of inherency is not a substitute for some teaching or suggestion which supports the selection and use of various elements in the particular claimed combination.”). The Examiner has not provided evidence that compound An was known to be an NO-modulating agent in the prior art.

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Skidmore et al KRATZ 103(a) AUZVILLE JACKSON, JR.

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Gilgen et al BARRETT 101/103(a) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP

"Software" claimed, for example, as "executable code" or as mere functions is similarly not within any of the four statutory categories and is not patent eligible subject matter. See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159 (CCPA 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting) ("It has never been otherwise than perfectly clear to those desiring patent protection on inventions which are new and useful programs for general purpose computers (software) that the only way it could be obtained would be to describe and claim (35 U.S.C. § 112) the invention as a 'process' or a 'machine.'"). It is now also common to claim software as a "manufacture" by reciting storing program code stored on a tangible medium that, when executed, will perform a method. But, software per se is not a "manufacture" under § 101.

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Hetzler et al HAIRSTON 102(e)/103(a) MOHAMMED KASHEF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

Ex Parte Jeon MARTIN 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) BIRCH STEWART KOLASCH & BIRCH

A statement by an applicant during prosecution identifying certain matter not the work of the same inventor as “prior art” is an admission that the matter is prior art. Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co. , 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Such an admission can be relied on as support for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 570-71 (CCPA 1975) (“We see no reason why appellants’ representations in their application should not be accepted at face value as admissions that Figs. 1 and 2 may be considered ‘prior art’ for any purpose, including use as evidence of obviousness under § 103.”). Furthermore, a person is barred by 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) from obtaining a patent on that which is obtained from someone else whose possession of the subject matter is inherently “prior.” See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. , 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Section 102(f) provides that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless ‘he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.’ This is a derivation provision, which provides that one may not obtain a patent on that which is obtained from someone else whose possession of the subject matter is inherently ‘prior.’”). Derivation of an invention from the work of another can be applied as § 102(f) prior art in a rejection based on §§ 102(f) and 103. Id. at 1403-04 (“[S]ubject matter derived from another not only is itself unpatentable to the party who derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with other prior art, may make a resulting obvious invention unpatentable to that party under a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103.”).


Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co. , 324 F.3d 1346, 66 USPQ2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . .706.02, 2129, 2141.01

Nomiya, In re, 509 F.2d 566, 184 USPQ 607 (CCPA 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2129, 2258

OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 43 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706.02(l) , 2004

Ex Parte Natarajan et al BARRETT 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Bertram NAPPI 103(a) GIFFORD, KRASS, SPRINKLE,ANDERSON & CITKOWSKI, P.C

Ex Parte Kennedy et al HAIRSTON 103(a) MHKKG/SUN

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Shuster LORIN 112(2)/103(a) KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Ditzel et al DELMENDO 112(2)/112(1)/102(b)/103(a) SIEMENS CORPORATION

Monday, December 21, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Iversen et al PRATS 103(a) KING & SPALDING LLP

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Gillespie et al McKELVEY 103(a) ALSTON & BIRD LLP

All can agree that 20% is not "25% by weight or greater".

But, does "about 20%" read on "25% by weight or greater"?

Use of "about 20%" would lead one skilled in the art to believe that Mleziva was not limiting the amount of reclaimed polymer to "20%". In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (use of "about" in a claim shows that the applicant does not intend to limit the claimed ranges to their exact end-points). "About" generally means "approximately." Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 395 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

The following helpful analysis concerning "about" in claims appears in Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp. , 543 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008): The word about does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and its meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case. When about is used as part of a numeric range, the use of the word about avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter. Its range must be interpreted in its technologic and stylistic context. In determining how far beyond the claimed range the term about extends the claim, we must focus on the criticality of the numerical limitation to the invention.

While most of the cases focus on the meaning of "about" in a claim, this case involves the meaning of "about" in a prior art reference.

Harris, In re, 409 F.3d 1339, 74 USPQ2d 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . 2144.05

Merck & Co., Inc., v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. , 395 F.3d 1364, 73 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2111.01

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Yoneyama FRANKLIN 103(a) FRISHAUF, HOLTZ, GOODMAN & CHICK, PC

3700
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Pfister et al TURNER 102(b) Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Banerjee et al FREDMAN 102(e)/103(a) ERIC P. MIRABEL

1700
Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Holzschuh et al NAGUMO 103(a) YOUNG & THOMPSON

Thus, in an obviousness rejection, the prior art must provide a reference process as well as evidence that the modifications necessary to obtain the claimed process would have been obvious. (Cf. the role of the requirement, under some circumstances, that the prior art provide a “lead compound” when considering the obviousness of a chemical compound, discussed in Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. , 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

Friday, December 18, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Bretler GRIMES 103(a) WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

Ex Parte HSU et al CRAWFORD 103(a) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Jones WARREN 103(a) DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP

The Examiner has not addressed the evidence in Specification Example 1 in considering Appellant’s position. See generally Ans. Thus, the Examiner has not based the conclusion of unpatentability set forth in the Answer on the totality of the record. See, e.g.,
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.”) (citing, inter alia, In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3 [sic - n.4] (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also, e.g., In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and cases cited therein (applicant’s rebuttal evidence must be considered). Indeed, the Examiner’s failure to consider the evidence in Specification Example 1, properly relied on by Appellant, is clear error. See, e.g., Sullivan, 498 F.3d at 1355.

Oetiker, In re, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .707.07(f) , 716.01(d) , 1504.01(a) , 2106, 2107.02, 2142, 2145, 2164.07

Spada, In re, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2112.01

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Karaoguz et al DIXON 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Roh HORNER 102(b)/103(a) LAW OFFICE OF DALE B. HALLING

Ex Parte Gooding et al CRAWFORD 102(e) KING & SPALDING

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Scheifele McCARTHY 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Komatsu et al WARREN 103(a) PAULY, DEVRIES, SMITH & DEFFNER, L.L.C.

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Deeds DIXON 103(a) BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review

Ex Parte Hand SONG 103(a) Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone P.L.C.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design

Ex Parte Stinson BOALICK 102(b)/103(a) HOFFMANN & BARON, LLP

“By using the term ‘consisting essentially of,’ the drafter signals that the invention necessarily includes the listed ingredients and is open to unlisted ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention.”
PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp. , 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To construe the phrase “consisting essentially of,” it is “necessary and proper to determine” the interpretation that the Specification reasonably supports. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551 (CCPA 1976). Furthermore, Appellant has the burden of showing that unclaimed limitations in a prior art reference would materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 874 (CCPA 1964).

PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163

Herz, In re, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461(CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

De Lajarte, In re, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). . . . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163

Ex Parte Walzak et al BAHR 103(a) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP

Evidence related solely to the number of units sold, without any indication as to whether this represents a substantial quantity in the market, provides a very weak showing of commercial success, if any. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Even assuming an applicant has sufficiently demonstrated commercial success, that success is relevant in the obviousness context only if it is established that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention (i.e., a nexus between the sales and the merits of the claimed invention), as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the claimed subject matter. Id. See also Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. , 776 F.2d 309, 315-16 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (commercial success may have been attributable to extensive advertising and position as a market leader before the introduction of the patented product).

Huang, In re, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . 716.03, 716.03(b) , 2145

Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. , 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . .716.03(b) , 716.06, 2141.01(a)

Thursday, December 17, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Hwang et al GREEN 103(a) THOMAS, KAYDEN, HORSTEMEYER & RISLEY, LLP

Ex Parte Masuda et al GREEN 103(a) KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Patel et al SAADAT 103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

Ex Parte Kapur HAHN 103(a) Ryan, Mason & Lewis, L.L.P.

Ex Parte Bray et al SAADAT 102(b)/103(a) GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Balogh CRAWFORD 112(2)/103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Alexander J. Burke

The context of the surrounding words of the claim must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

ACTV, Inc. v. The Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 68 USPQ2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.01

Ex Parte Oddsen STAICOVICI 103(a) DESIGN IP, P.C.

An overly broad interpretation, as the Examiner suggests, would eviscerate the meaning of the phrase integrally formed because it would mean that all components of APA’s channel 14 as modified by the boss of Matsubara or Schwartztrauber are integrally formed merely because they are interconnected to each other in some manner. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions which render phrases in claims superfluous).

Ex Parte Wang et al LORIN 102(b)/103(a) NIXON PEABODY, LLP

Ex Parte Webster et al BAHR 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) K&L Gates LLP

The description requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement of that provision. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. Id.

Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 USPQ2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991). . .1504.20, 2161, 2163, 2163.02, 2164, 2181

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Kaylor et al McCARTHY 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.

Ex Parte Kroese et al STAICOVICI 102(b)/103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Ashcraft et al HOMERE 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) DUKE W. YEE YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Ex Parte Serlet et al DIXON 103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC

2600 Communications
Ex Parte Shu et al MARTIN 102(e)/103(a) GOODWIN PROCTER LLP

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Dennis et al KERINS 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL LLP

Ex Parte Fisher et al CRAWFORD 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) O'BANION & RITCHEY LLP/ SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Fabian et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) ERNEST D. BUFF

Ex Parte Rittner et al GREEN 102(b)/103(a) MCGLEW & TUTTLE, PC

Ex Parte Schramm ROBERTSON 112(1)/112(2)/102(b)/102(e)/103(a) Michael R. Schramm

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Stamler et al ADAMS 112(1)/103(a) BACON & THOMAS, PLLC

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Hicks et al MOHANTY 103(a) AT&T Legal Department - CC

Ex Parte Marsh BAHR 102(e)/103(a) KINNEY & LANGE, P.A.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs
Ex Parte Racenet et al O’NEILL 103(a) TYCO HEALTHCARE GROUP LP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte VanderVelde et al STEPHENS 103(a) PANDUIT CORP.

Ex Parte Bello et al THOMAS 112(1)/103(a) KUNZLER & McKENZIE

In other words, Claim 1’s “if” statement sets forth a necessary prelude to reordering the requests. Thus, the “if” statement must be given weight. “[E]very limitation positively recited in a claim must be given effect in order to determine what subject matter that claim defines.” In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 1970). See also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the court can not ignore a plethora of meaningful limitations).

Wilson, In re, 424 F.2d 1382, 165 USPQ 494, (CCPA 1970).. . . . . . . . . . . .2143.03, 2173.06

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Fang et al TURNER 103(a) DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

Ex Parte Grundfest MOHANTY 103(a) SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.


Tuesday, December 15, 2009

REHEARING DENIED

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Mostafazadeh et al JEFFERY 35 U.S.C. § 251 improper recapture Beyer Law Group LLP

Lastly, Appellants challenge the basis for our declining to follow the precedential Board decision Ex parte Eggert, 67 USPQ2d 1716 (BPAI 2003). Request, at 13-14. Although Appellants contend otherwise, we maintain that Eggert is inconsistent with the rationale expressed in the subsequent Federal Circuit decision, North Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Pkg., Inc. , 415 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Decision, at 14 n.5. We therefore decline to follow this conflicting older Board precedent. See Standard Operating Procedure 2, Publication of Opinions and Binding Precedent (“SOP 2”), § VI(D) (BPAI Mar. 23, 2008), at 6 (“All judges, including the Chief Judge, are bound by a published or otherwise disseminated Precedential opinion of the Board unless the decision supported by the opinion is . . . inconsistent with a decision of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”) (emphases added).

Eggert, Ex parte, 67 USPQ2d 1716 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 1412.02


North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc. , 415 F.3d 1335, 75 USPQ2d 1545(Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . 1412.02

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Luczak HASTINGS 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C. (P&W)

2400
Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Salmi et al BARRY 102(e)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Perman & Green, LLP

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

Ex Parte Bao KIMLIN 102(e)/103(a) HITT GAINES, PC ALCATEL-LUCENT

3600
Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Koelzer O’NEILL 103(a) ST. ONGE STEWARD JOHNSTON & REENS, LLC

Ex Parte Hanson et al HORNER 102(b) GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN

3700
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Heiman HORNER 103(a) WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP

Ex Parte Nicklas TIERNEY 103(a) Houston Eliseeva

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Jha et al GAUDETTE 102(e)/102(b)/103(a) LANDO & ANASTASI, LLP

2600
Communications
Ex Parte Gehring et al JEFFERY 112(2)/102(e)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

2800
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
Ex Parte Nishimura NAGUMO 102(b) Kathy Manke Avago Technologies Limited

3600
Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Peterson HORNER 102(e)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

Monday, December 14, 2009

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Blonder et al ADAMS 103(a) MARSH, FISCHMANN & BREYFOGLE LLP

Ex Parte Hunt GRIMES 103(a) STEPHEN DONOVAN ALLERGAN, INC.

“Mere improvement in properties does not always suffice to show unexpected results. In our view, however, when an applicant demonstrates substantially improved results . . . and states that the results were unexpected, this should suffice to establish unexpected results in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

Soni, In re, 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2145

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Kawakami et al WARREN 102(b)/103(a) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED

Ex Parte Rose et al KIMLIN 103(c) KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Barsness et al SIU 103(a) IBM CORPORATION

Ex Parte Jones et al HUGHES 103(a) Mueller and Smith, LPA

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

Ex Parte Sato BAUMEISTER 102(b) RADER FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Designs

Ex Parte Rogers et al McCOLLUM 103(a) GOODWIN PROCTER LLP

Ex Parte Toback O’NEILL 103(a) ALIX YALE & RISTAS LLP

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Kolovson THOMAS 102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

3600
Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Fine et al CRAWFORD 101/102(e)/103(a) AT&T LEGAL DEPARTMENT - Toler

Utility

As a matter of Patent Office practice, a specification which contains a
disclosure of utility which corresponds in scope to the subject matter sought to
be patented must be taken as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of §
101 for the entire claimed subject matter unless there is reason for one skilled
in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its
scope.
In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391-92 (CCPA 1974).

Langer, In re, 503 F.2d 1380, 183 USPQ 288 (CCPA 1974) . . . . . . . .2107.02, 2107.03, 2124