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Thursday, July 25, 2013

hyatt, fiers, morse, CLS, swanson

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REVERSED
Tech Center 1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1613 Ex Parte Feldman et al 11922952 - (D) GRIMES 112(1)/112(2)/103 DILWORTH & BARRESE, LLP ARNOLD, ERNST V

Tech Center 2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2155 Ex Parte Bhasker et al 10888265 - (D) MacDONALD 103 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 112(1) Baker Botts LLP LEWIS, CHERYL RENEA

The scope of claim 10 encompasses any and all (present and future) processing instructions for directing a computer to perform the claimed steps. Yet, Appellants’ Specification discloses at most only those processing instructions known to the inventor. Our reviewing court has concluded that such all-encompassing claims do not comply with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

Because the count at issue purports to cover all DNAs that code for <>–IF, it is also analogous to a single means claim, which has been held not to comply with the first paragraph of section 112. See In re Hyatt, 708 F. 2d 712, [714] (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“the enabling disclosure of the specification [must] be commensurate in scope with the claim under consideration.”) Claiming all DNA’s that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.

Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(emphasis added).

The proper statutory basis for the rejection of a single means claim is the requirement of the first paragraph of § 112 that the enabling disclosure of the specification be commensurate in scope with the claim under consideration.

The long-recognized problem with a single means claim is that it covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the specification discloses at most only those means known to the inventor. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1853).

In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(footnotes omitted).

We note that claims in the standard Beauregard-type computer program product means-plus-function format avoid this enablement problem.

The final paragraph of § 112 saves combination claims drafted using means-plus-function format from this problem by providing a construction of that format narrow enough to avoid the problem of undue breadth as forbidden by the first paragraph. But no provision saves a claim drafted in means-plus-function format which is not drawn to a combination, i.e., a single means claim. 

Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 715.

hyatt HARMON 5: 41; 6: 63; 19: 275, 324
DONNER 10: 1107; 11: 10, 25
o'reilly HARMON 2: 31
DONNER 2: 490; 4: 53, 82, 83; 6: 25; 9: 7; 10: 1106
fiers HARMON 5: 17, 138, 158, 165, 177; 18: 53, 148, 152
DONNER 4: 59; 5: 129, 143; 9: 15, 510

Tech Center 2600 Communications
2675 Ex Parte J├Ârgens et al 10572274 - (D) SCHEINER 103 SCHIFF HARDIN, LLP WASHINGTON, JAMARES

Tech Center 2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2857 Ex Parte Lang 10591897 - (D) McKONE 112(2)/103 MICHAEL J. STRIKER WEST, JEFFREY R

Tech Center 3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3634 Ex Parte Costello et al 12186084 - (D) BROWN 103 FAY SHARPE LLP PUROL, DAVID M

3689 Ex Parte Haebig et al 10880795 - (D) PETRAVICK 112(2)/103 Davidson, Davidson & Kappel, LLC NGUYEN, TAN D

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3772 Ex Parte Weaver et al 10409308 - (D) STAICOVICI 102/103 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY BROWN, MICHAEL A

AFFIRMED 
Tech Center 1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1715 Ex Parte Bowman 11840282 - (D) HOUSEL 103 PPG INDUSTRIES INC LIGHTFOOT, ELENA TSOY

1746 Ex Parte Krispin et al 11528929 - (D) DELMENDO 103 LERNER GREENBERG STEMER LLP AFTERGUT, JEFFRY H

1765 Ex Parte Tsutsui et al 12173372 - (D) FRANKLIN 103 OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. LISTVOYB, GREGORY

1767 Ex Parte Licht et al 12065036 - (D) FRANKLIN 103 OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. SALVITTI, MICHAEL A

1787 Ex Parte Paiva et al 11576951 - (D) KIMLIN 102/103 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY AHMED, SHEEBA

Tech Center 2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2161 Ex Parte Bhatia 11088700 - (D) CURCURI 103 Baker Botts LLP LE, HUNG D

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3717 Ex Parte Amir et al 10569212 - (D) PER CURIAM 103 NAOMI ASSIA AHMED, MASUD

VACATED
Tech Center 1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1645 Ex Parte McLeod et al 11998988 - (D) GRIMES 102/112(2) 37 CFR § 41.50(b) 112(b) USMRMC-OSJA MS. ELIZABETH ARWINE, ESQ. BASKAR, PADMAVATHI

REHEARING

DENIED
Tech Center 1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1767 Ex Parte Mabey et al 11654486 - (R) DELMENDO 103/double patenting CHRISTOPHER JOHN RUDY STANLEY, JANE L

Tech Center 2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2193 Ex Parte Gustavson et al 11035933 - (D) MACDONALD 101 MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC MALZAHN, DAVID H

Appellants’ first contention that the Board has erred is based on several points.

1) That the holding in CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., ___ F.3d ____, 2013 WL 1920941, No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) requires the Board’s decision to “identify the fundamental concept (i.e., abstract idea) [ ] at risk of preemption.” (Rehearing Request 4).

2) That the Board’s rejection fails to “articulate the fundamental concept that allegedly is wrapped up in the claimed invention and at risk of preemption” as required by CLS. (Rehearing Request 1).

First, contrary to Appellants’ allegation, the holding in CLS v. Alice does not require the Board’s Decision to identify the fundamental concept or in fact to do anything else. Rather, as Chief Judge Rader points out “nothing said today beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent.” CLS, ___ F.3d at ____n.1, 2013 WL 1920941 at *20 n.1 (Rader, Chief Judge concurring-in-part dissenting-in-part).

Second, although Appellants are misguided in relying on CLS, we note that any rejection must begin “by determining what, precisely, the applicant has invented and is seeking to patent, and how the claims relate to and define that invention. (MPEP § 2103 I; 8th Ed., Rev. 9).” (Decision 16). The Board does precisely this at pages 22-25 of their Decision.

REEXAMINATION

AFFIRMED

Tech Center 2400 Networking, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security
2456 Ex Parte BROCADE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, INC. Patent Owner and Appellant 90011763 7,840,678 WEINBERG 102 Novak Druce + Quigg LLP 2nd Reexam Group THIRD PARTY REQUESTER: FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP STEELMAN, MARY J original WON, MICHAEL YOUNG

In reexaminations, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, not the conclusive burden of proof Appellant posits. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also 37 CFR § 1.555(b) referring to the preponderance of the evidence, burden of proof standard.

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