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Tuesday, March 9, 2010

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Akhavan-Tafti et al SCHEINER 103(a) NEXGEN DIAGNOSTICS, LLC

Ex Parte Bodmeier GRIMES 112(2)/102(e)/103(a)/obviousness-type double patenting INNOVAR, LLC

“[B]readth is not to be equated with indefiniteness.” In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971).

Miller, In re, 441 F.2d 689, 169 USPQ 597 (CCPA 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2173.04

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering

Ex Parte Raffel et al NAGUMO 102(b)/103(a)/obviousness-type double patenting LUCAS & MERCANTI, LLP

As the Appellant, Raffel bears the procedural burden of showing harmful error in the Examiner’s rejections. See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1706 (2009):

it is clear that the burden of showing that the error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination. . . . To say that the claimant has the ‘burden’ of showing that an error was harmful is not to impose a complex system of ‘burden shifting’ rules or a particularly onerous requirement. . . .the party seeking reversal normally must explain why the erroneous ruling caused harm.
See also, In re Chapman, 2010 WL 638277, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 2010), citing Sanders as well as Federal Circuit precedent. In parallel with appeals to the Federal Circuit, an appellant to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences must show error in the Examiner’s rejections. The necessity of such a showing is emphasized by the court’s rulings that a failure to raise arguments to the Board results in waiver of such arguments before the court. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Hyatt, In re, 211 F.3d 1367, 54 USPQ2d1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2111

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
Ex Parte Rutledge et al COURTENAY 102(b)/103(a) JACKIE JAY SCHWARTZ

Ex Parte Sahota et al BARRETT 103(a) BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD

We will not speculate that the functions are the same just because the names are the same. It is improper to resort to speculation or unfounded assumptions to supply deficiencies in the factual basis for a rejection. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) ("[The Patent Office] may not, because it may doubt that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis.").

Warner, In re, 379 F.2d 1011, 154 USPQ 173 (CCPA 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2142

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Galli et al C. THOMAS 103(a) Robert V. Wilder

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Leistner et al HORNER 102(b) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.

Ex Parte Shichi MOHANTY 103(a) YOUNG & THOMPSON

Ex Parte Smith et al LORIN 112(2)/102(e) JAMES M. STOVER TERADATA CORPORATION

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Langdon et al O’NEILL 102(b)/103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY

The drawing has to show the subject matter with great particularity when the subject matter is unexplained in order for the drawing to be dispositive in finding the subject matter lying within a claim to be old. In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972).

Mraz, In re, 455 F.2d 1069, 173 USPQ 25 (CCPA 1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2125

Ex Parte McDonnell O’NEILL 103(a) MANELLI DENISON & SELTER

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
Ex Parte Roberts et al McCOLLUM 103(a) NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS

"Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence." In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). "An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness." In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

In addition, "it is well settled that unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. ‘Mere argument or conclusory statements in the specification does not suffice.’" Id. (quoting In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). "[W]hen unexpected results are used as evidence of nonobviousness, the results must be shown to be unexpected compared with the closest prior art." In re Baxter-Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Geisler, In re, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . .2144.05, 2145

De Blauwe, In re, 736 F.2d 699, 222 USPQ 191 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . . . 716.01(c) , 2145

Baxter Travenol Labs., In re, 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . .2131.01, 2145

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
Ex Parte Nevill JEFFERY 102(b) WHITE & CASE LLP

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components

Ex Parte Vancoille WHITEHEAD, JR. 102(b)/103(a) Kathy Manke Avago Technologies Limited