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PTAB.US: Decisions of PTAB Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Showing posts with label herz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label herz. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

herz

REVERSED

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2437 Ex Parte Andersson 11/261,177 DILLON obviousness-type double patenting/112(1)/102(b)/103(a) POTOMAC PATENT GROUP PLLC EXAMINER WILLIAMS, JEFFERY L

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3632 Ex Parte Bernard et al 11/222,688 SAINDON 102(b) MCDONNELL BOEHNEN HULBERT & BERGHOFF LLP EXAMINER WOOD, KIMBERLY T

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3715 Ex Parte Chen et al 10/631,068 KAUFFMAN 103(a) DUKE W. YEE YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C. EXAMINER UTAMA, ROBERT J

3754 Ex Parte Garcia et al 10/525,224 SAINDON 103(a) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC EXAMINER NGO, LIEN M

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1627 Ex Parte Student et al 11/554,705 SCHEINER 102(a,e)/102(b)/103(a) MOMENTIVE PERFORMANCE MATERIALS INC.-Quartz c/o DILWORTH & BARRESE, LLP EXAMINER SOROUSH, LAYLA

“[C]laims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . [A]n applicant who has not clearly limited his claims is in a weak position to assert a narrow construction. Therefore, in construing the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ in appellants’ claims, it is necessary and proper to determine whether their specification reasonably supports a construction that would include additives such as [those in the prior art].” In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551 (CCPA 1976).

Herz, In re, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2161 Ex Parte Young 10/315,562 BARRY 103(a) LAW OFFICE OF JIM BOICE EXAMINER STACE, BRENT S


AFFIRMED

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2113 Ex Parte Ahmed et al 11/116,553 DESHPANDE 103(a) SMITH FROHWEIN TEMPEL GREENLEE BLAHA LLC EXAMINER RIAD, AMINE

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3694 Ex Parte Galai et al 10/483,997 LORIN 112(1)/103(a) FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER LLP EXAMINER COLBERT, ELLA

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

herz, PPG, de lajarte, hoffman, finisar

REVERSED

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
07/12/2011 2854 Ex Parte Petermann 10/733,484 RUGGIERO 102(b)/103(a) Davidson, Davidson & Kappel, LLC EXAMINER FERGUSON SAMRETH, MARISSA LIANA

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
07/12/2011 3657 Ex Parte Davison et al 11/166,388 HORNER 103(a) MARSHALL & MELHORN, LLC EXAMINER SY, MARIANO ONG

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
07/12/2011 3767 Ex Parte Dolliver et al 10/787,849 O’NEILL 102(b)/103(a) HAEMONETICS CORPORATION EXAMINER WITCZAK, CATHERINE

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
07/12/2011 1617 Ex Parte Martin 11/914,485 GREEN 103(a) FMC CORPORATION EXAMINER BUCKLEY, AUDREA

The “phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ limits the scope of a claim to the specified ingredients and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s) of a composition.” In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52 (CCPA 1976) (emphasis added); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir 1998). Appellant bears the burden of establishing that the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention would be materially affected by, or at least reasonably expected to be materially affected by, any component or step of an applied reference that is argued to be excluded by a “consisting essentially of” transitional phrase used in the claims. See In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 873-74 (CCPA 1964); Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (BPAI 1989).

Herz, In re, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir.1998) . . . . . .2111.03, 2163

De Lajarte, In re, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). . . . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163

Hoffman, Ex parte, 12 USPQ2d 1061 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

REEXAMINATION

EXAMINER AFFIRMED

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)
07/13/2011 3993 Ex parte BioCybernetics International, Inc., Appellant and Patent Owner 90/010,605 6,213,968 LANE 103(a) SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP EXAMINER REIP, DAVID OWEN

Cf. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 2011 WL 2307402 at *5 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2011) (holding, based on expert testimony, that prior apparatuses taught away from the claimed apparatus because they improved a certain parameter in a different way).

AFFIRMED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
07/13/2011 1761 Ex Parte Brooker et al 11/329,008 PRATS 102(b)/103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY EXAMINER DOUYON, LORNA M

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
07/13/2011 2123 Ex Parte Freeman et al 11/235,344 ZECHER 101/102(b) Mr. Christopher John Rourk Jackson Walker LLP EXAMINER OSBORNE, LUKE R

See Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, Inc. 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, "the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm") (citations and quotation marks omitted.). As such, the application must disclose “enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure under § 112, ¶ 6” or a disclosure that can be expressed in any understandable terms (e.g., a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flowchart). Id. But “[s]imply reciting "software" without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function is not enough.” Id. at 1341-42 (citation omitted).

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
07/13/2011 3743 Ex Parte Yang et al 10/451,340 O’NEILL 103(a) MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP EXAMINER LU, JIPING

REHEARING

GRANTED - REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
07/13/2011 1645 Ex Parte Degelaen et al 10/170,343 GREEN 103(a) Butzel Long EXAMINER ZEMAN, ROBERT A

Monday, April 25, 2011

Jung, hyatt, frye, PPG, herz, de lajarte, hoffman, schreiber, ludtke, hallman

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1735 Ex Parte Clark et al 11/702,607 KRATZ 102(b)/103(a) OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC EXAMINER KERNS, KEVIN P
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2448 Ex Parte Chalupsky et al 10/656,652 DANG 102(e)/103(a) Caven & Aghevli LLC c/o CPA Global EXAMINER WHIPPLE, BRIAN P
2600 Communications
2614 Ex Parte Brady et al 10/217,795 KRIVAK 103(a) AT&T Legal Department - JW EXAMINER TRAN, QUOC DUC

REEXAMINATION

EXAMINER AFFIRMED

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)

2163 Ex parte NETAPP, INC. 90/009,129 7,174,352 EASTHOM 112(2)/305/102(b) PATENT OWNER CESARI AND MCKENNA, LLP THIRD PARTY REQUESTER RONALD L. YIN DLA PIPER US LLP EXAMINER CHOI, WOO H original EXAMINER LE, UYEN T

By failing to "articulate what gaps, in fact exist" between Gait and these claims, Appellant fails to show error, when as here, the Examiner put Appellant on notice as to how the claims were being treated. See In re Jung, No. 2011-1019, 2011 WL 1235093 * 4, 5 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2011). In Jung, the appellant at least alleged a gap existed, "but chose not to proffer a serious explanation of this difference." Id. at * 7. The failure to allege such a gap exists constitutes an effective waiver. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may treat arguments appellant failed to make for a given ground of rejection as waived); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) ("If an appellant fails to present arguments on a particular issue — or, more broadly, on a particular rejection — the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection.")

Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 83 USPQ2d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . 2163.04

AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1653 Ex Parte Bamba et al 10/182,908 McCOLLUM 102(b)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, McCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. EXAMINER VERA AFREMOVA
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1726 Ex Parte Guthrie 10/816,403 GARRIS 102(b)/103(a) M. P. Williams EXAMINER
WALKER, KEITH D

1761 Ex Parte Yang et al 10/951,849 KRATZ 103(a) ARKEMA INC. EXAMINER SZEKELY, PETER A

Concerning the first issue and the claim term “consisting essentially of”, it is well settled that the term “consisting essentially of” is interpreted as allowing for the inclusion not only of those ingredients specifically recited, but also those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of a claimed invention. PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52 (CCPA 1976). However, the burden is on Appellants to show what the basic and novel characteristics are and how they would be materially changed by the ingredient of the reference sought to be excluded from inclusion by Appellants’ use of this term. See In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 873-74 (CCPA 1964); Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (BPAI 1989).

PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir.1998) . . . . . .2111.03, 2163

Herz, In re, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

De Lajarte, In re, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). . . . . . . . . . 2111.03, 2163

Hoffman, Ex parte, 12 USPQ2d 1061 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03

1767 Ex Parte Haider et al 11/315,639 GRIMES 102(b)/103(a) BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE LLC EXAMINER HEINCER, LIAM J

1789 Ex Parte De Haan et al 10/380,883 TIMM 102(b)/103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC EXAMINER WONG, LESLIE A

Choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by what it does, carries with it a risk: Where there is reason to conclude that the structure of the prior art is inherently capable of performing the claimed function, the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the claimed function patentably distinguishes the claimed structure from the prior art structure. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 664 (CCPA 1971); In re Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215 (CCPA 1981).

Schreiber, In re, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . 2111.02, 2112, 2114

Ludtke, In re, 441 F.2d 660, 169 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2112.01

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2185 Ex Parte Zilavy 10/984,478 DANG 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER CHOE, YONG J