Thursday August 5, 2010

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
Ex Parte Burger et al 11/008,413 GARRIS 102(b)/103(a) RICHARD L. MAYER, ESQ. KENYON & KENYON Examiner Name: KACKAR, RAM N

If the claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, or, if the claim preamble is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 1999).

Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 51 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.02

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Skvorc 10/498,188 McCARTHY 103(a) PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN, LLP Examiner Name: PARSLEY, DAVID J

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
Ex Parte Morimoto 10/134,261 LORIN 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) ROBERT C. KOWERT CONLEY, ROSE, & TAYON, P.C. Examiner Name: THEIN, MARIA TERESA T

Some cases state the standard as “the broadest reasonable interpretation,” see, e.g., In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993), others include the qualifier “consistent with the specification” or similar language, see, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “Since it would be unreasonable for the PTO to ignore any interpretive guidance afforded by the applicant's written description, either phrasing connotes the same notion: as an initial matter, the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Giving claim 21 the broadest reasonable construction, we find that claim 21 encompasses forms of the computer program code being embodied on transitory propagating signals per se. A signal does not fit within at least one of the four statutory subject matter categories under 35 U.S.C. §101. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Van Geuns, In re, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . .707.07(f), 2145

Bond, In re, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . 2131, 2183, 2184

Morris, In re, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . 904.01, 2106, 2111, 2163, 2173.05(a), 2181

Nuitjen, In re, Docket No. 2006-1371 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . .2106

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
Ex Parte Akizuki et al 11/011,204 LEE, dissenting in part TORZON 101 SUGHRUE Examiner Name: CHANG, RICK KILTAE

Mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable eligible under §101. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Mental processes are not patentable even if they have a practical application. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979.

A claim reciting insignificant post solution activity does not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972). . . . .2106, 2106.01, 2106.02

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2106

NEW

REVERSED

Ex Parte Sugiura et al

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

Ex Parte Ramirez et al

REEXAMINATION

REXNORD INDUSTRIES, LLC, Requester and Cross-Appellant, v. HABASIT BELTING, INC., Patent Owner and Appellant.

AFFIRMED

Ex Parte Fischer et al
Ex Parte Heuer et al
Ex Parte Schlesiger et al
Ex Parte Shim et al
Ex Parte Shimo

REHEARING

Ex Parte MacInnis et al