ariad, hyatt

US 6,592,593 B1

custom search

REVERSED
Tech Center 1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1735 Ex Parte Egli 11311748 - (D) KATZ 102/103 The Dow Chemical Company ROHM AND HAAS ELECTRONIC MATERIALS LLC IP, SIKYIN
Tech Center 2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2161 Ex Parte Parees et al 11858931 - (D) COURTENAY 103 IBM CORP. (WSM) c/o WINSTEAD P.C. LU, CHARLES EDWARD

2168 Ex Parte van Beek et al 10867981 - (D) HUME 103 CHERNOFF VILHAUER MCCLUNG & STENZEL, LLP LY,CHEYNE D

Tech Center 2400 Networking, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security
2456 Ex Parte Harrington 11774660 - (D) DANG 102 Yudell Isidore Ng Russell PLLC BARQADLE, YASIN M

Tech Center 3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3664 Ex Parte Fletcher et al 11581094 - (D) PLENZLER 103 HONEYWELL/IFL KISWANTO, NICHOLAS

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3773 Ex Parte Taylor et al 11544477 - (D) GRIMES 112(1) 102/103 Covidien LP LAUER, CHRISTINA C

See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”).

Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 94 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc) 2161.01

AFFIRMED
Tech Center 2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2128 Ex Parte Linder et al 10103123 - (D) JEFFERY 103 Siemens Corporation ALHIJA, SAIF A

Tech Center 2400 Networking, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security
2426 Ex Parte Nakatsuyama 10725149 - (D) KUMAR 102/103 MAYER & WILLIAMS PC ZHONG,JUN FEI

2437 Ex Parte Himmel et al 11764829 - (D) CURCURI 103 IBM AUSTIN IPLAW (DG) C/O DELIZIO GILLIAM, PLLC ABYANEH, ALI S

2478 Ex Parte Eytchison et al 10763866 - (D) QUINN 103 HAVERSTOCK & OWENS LLP ALI, FARHAD

Tech Center 2600 Communications
2699 Ex Parte Chung et al 10844544 - (D) SMITH 103/obviousness-type double patenting H.C. PARK & ASSOCIATES, PLC LIANG, REGINA

Tech Center 2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2885 Ex Parte Yaw et al 11941627 - (D) SMITH 102/103 Fox Rothschild LLP NEGRON, ISMAEL

Tech Center 3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3631 Ex Parte Stewart et al 11211978 - (D) BAHR 103 CAROTHERS AND CAROTHERS STERLING, AMY JO

3634 Ex Parte Ulatowski 11316074 - (D) HORNER 112(2)/103 DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP - Denver PUROL, DAVID M

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3778 Ex Parte DeVries et al 11979142 - (D) FRANKLIN 103/non-statutory obviousness-type double patenting McDermott Will & Emery LLP DIXON, ANNETTE FREDRICKA

See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, . . . the Board may treat any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived. In the event of such a waiver, the PTO may affirm the rejection of the group of claims that the examiner rejected on that ground without considering the merits of those rejections.”). See also MPEP § 1205.02 (“If a ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant‟s brief, that ground of rejection will be summarily sustained by the Board.”).

REEXAMINATION

AFFIRMED
Tech Center 3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)
3663 GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. Requester and Appellant v. PIONEER CORPORATION Patent Owner 95001335 6941222 10/132,570 WEINBERG 103 YOUNG & THOMPSON CABRERA, ZOILA E original TO, TUAN C

lockwood, ariad

custom search

REVERSED
Tech Center 2600 Communications
2625 Ex Parte Newell et al 10455588 - (D) KRIVAK 103 HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY MCLEAN, NEIL R

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3734 Ex Parte Sisken 11488331 - (D) SNEDDEN 103 BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE/CHICAGO/COOK HOLLM, JONATHAN A

3752 Ex Parte Bevilacqua et al 10561065 - (D) JUNG 112(1)/112(2)/103 HEDMAN & COSTIGAN, P.C. KIM, CHRISTOPHER S

3783 Ex Parte Tanida et al 11632269 - (D) VANOPHEM 103 HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. COLEMAN, KEITH A

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
Tech Center 2400 Networking, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security
2421 Ex Parte Kikinis 09875546 - (D) BARRY 112(1)/102/103 112(1) BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD. SALCE, JASON P

"[I]t is 'not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be able to construct the patentee's device from the teachings of the disclosure . . . . Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device.'" Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)). See also Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[W]e have repeatedly stated that actual 'possession' or reduction to practice outside of the specification is not enough. Rather . . . it is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession."). "A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient." Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.

Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1505, 41 USPQ2d 1961 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . 2133.03(a), 2163, 2163.02

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3778 Ex Parte Digiacomantonio et al 10852629 - (D) JENKS 103 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 103 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY HAND, MELANIE JO

3788 Ex Parte Oh 11541368 - (D) ROBERTSON 103 103 IMPERIUM PATENT WORKS GRANO, ERNESTO ARTURIO

AFFIRMED
Tech Center 1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1716 Ex Parte Stirniman et al 10644054 - (D) GARRIS 102/103 Tabarrok & Zahrt (SEAGATE-10/11) MACARTHUR, SYLVIA

1765 Ex Parte Li et al 12247756 - (D) PRATS 103 FINA TECHNOLOGY INC LENIHAN, JEFFREY S

1765 Ex Parte Berzinis et al 11260711 - (D) KIMLIN 112(2) 112(1)/102 SABIC Geloy SABIC Innovative Plastics - IP Legal MULLIS, JEFFREY C

Tech Center 2400 Networking, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security
2424 Ex Parte Lowthert et al 09765246 - (D) ELLURU 103 TROP, PRUNER & HU, P.C. RAMAN, USHA

Tech Center 3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3682 Ex Parte Bergh et al 11549797 - (D) KIM 103/obviousness-type double patenting Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC ALVAREZ, RAQUEL

Tech Center 3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3721 Ex Parte Bilotti et al 11348543 - (D) SAINDON 103 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 103 WELSH FLAXMAN & GITLER LLC LOW, LINDSAY M

3731 Ex Parte Shabty et al 11942865 - (D) MILLS 103 DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC SIMPSON, SARAH A

3732 Ex Parte Laux 11711186 - (D) GRIMES 103 KLAUS J. BACH & ASSOCIATES ROSEN, ERIC J

bush, rishoi, young, ariad, turbocare, purdue pharma

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1789 Ex Parte Jansen et al 11/185,527 KATZ 103(a) WILLIAMS, MORGAN & AMERSON, P.C. EXAMINER HEGGESTAD, HELEN F

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3643 Ex Parte Lee et al 11/754,994 ADAMS 102(b)/103(a) PITTS & LAKE P C EXAMINER CONLON, MARISA

3682 Ex Parte Yeh et al 11/294,459 NAPPI 103(a) DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP EXAMINER ALVAREZ, RAQUEL
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2159 Ex Parte Trivedi et al 10/097,868 WINSOR 112(2)/103(a) 103(a) VERIZON EXAMINER SOMERS, MARC S

Appellants’ argument relies on the order in which the references were discussed, which is “of no significance, but merely a matter of exposition,” In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1961), and is unpersuasive.

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3776 Ex Parte Stookey et al 11/617,103 ADAMS 103(a) 103(a) Faegre Baker Daniels LLP EXAMINER PATEL, YOGESH P
AFFIRMED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1725 Ex Parte Oda et al 11/220,402 SCHAFER 103(a) FOLEY AND LARDNER LLP EXAMINER KOLLIAS, ALEXANDER C

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3616 Ex Parte Tracht 10/904,845 BARRETT 103(a) BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C. / LEAR CORPORATION EXAMINER TO, TOAN C

3653 Ex Parte Kitching et al 10/758,065 KAUFFMAN 102(b)/103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY EXAMINER BUTLER, MICHAEL E

See In re Rishoi, 197 F.2d 342, 345 (CCPA 1952) (“there is no patentable combination between a device and the material upon which it works” (citations omitted)).
...
In re Young, 75 F.2d 996 (CCPA 1935) (where a claim to a machine for making concrete beams was not patentable over the prior art, recitation in the body of the claim of the material worked upon, a concrete beam, did not lend patentability to that claim).

Young, In re, 75 F.2d 996, 25 USPQ 69 (CCPA 1935). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2115
3662 Ex Parte Mandel 10/367,027 HORNER 103(a) Yaron Nahum Mandel EXAMINER LOBO, IAN J

3738 Ex Parte Aram et al 11/171,180 PRATS 112(1)/102(e)/103(a) MAGINOT, MOORE & BECK, LLP EXAMINER SNOW, BRUCE EDWARD

See Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We now reaffirm that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from enablement . . . .”) (emphasis added).

As stated in TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001):

The written description requirement and its corollary, the new matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C. § 132, both serve to ensure that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject matter on the application filing date. When the applicant adds a claim or otherwise amends his specification after the original filing date . . ., the new claims or other added material must find support in the original specification.

It is well settled, however, that “[i]n order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 56 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . . . . . . 2163, 2163.05

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)
2876 Ex Parte 6130931 et al Ex parte ELISABETH KATZ and INDUTCH PROCESS CONTROLS, INC. 90/010,580 09/156,078 EASTHOM 103(a) STOCKWELL & SMEDLEY, PSC EXAMINER LEE, CHRISTOPHER E original EXAMINER HO, ALLEN C

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU)
3729 Ex Parte 6615485 et al Inter Partes FORMFACTOR, INC. Patent Owner, Appellant v. PHICOM CORPORATION Requestor, Respondent 95/000,358 10/034,543 EASTHOM 102(b)/103(a) Ken Burraston/FormFactor KIRTON & MCCONKIE EXAMINER FLANAGAN, BEVERLY MEINDL original EXAMINER ARBES, CARL J

levy, angstadt, vaeck, ariad

REVERSED

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2154 Ex Parte Hwang et al 11/580,713 BARRY 103(a) ROGITZ & ASSOCIATES EXAMINER PHILLIPS, III, ALBERT M

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3644 Ex Parte McCrory et al 11/033,024 GREENHUT 102(b) BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP EXAMINER PALO, FRANCIS T

What is lacking from the Examiner’s determinations of inherency is evidence or reasoning to show that the allegedly inherent feature or property must necessarily result from Mimura’s process or structure, respectively. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (BPAI 1990).

Levy, Ex parte, 17 USPQ2d 1461 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2112

3662 Ex Parte Martin et al 10/529,192 HORNER 102(b)/103(a) WesternGeco L.L.C. EXAMINER LOBO, IAN J

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1721 Ex Parte Zhuang et al 11/390,696 OWENS 102(b) 103(a) SLATER & MATSIL, L.L.P. EXAMINER JELSMA, JONATHAN G
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2427 Ex Parte Jerding et al 10/957,849 NAPPI 103(a) 103(a) MERCHANT & GOULD SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, A CISCO COMPANY EXAMINER STANLEY, MARK P
2600 Communications
2611 Ex Parte Mottier et al 10/815,724 STEPHENS 103(a) 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. EXAMINER LAM, KENNETH T

AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1655 Ex Parte Emery et al 10/749,602 PRATS 103(a) MUETING, RAASCH & GEBHARDT, P.A. EXAMINER LEITH, PATRICIA A

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1726 Ex Parte Stux et al 11/307,367 PAK 112(1)/103(a) 103(a) NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY EXAMINER DOVE, TRACY MAE

It is well established that the Examiner has the “burden of giving reasons, supported by the record as a whole, why the [S]pecification is not enabling . . . Showing that the disclosure entails undue experimentation is part of the PTO’s initial burden.” In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (CCPA 1976). In determining whether any given disclosure would require undue experimentation to practice the claimed subject matter, the Examiner must consider not only the breadth of the claims, the amount of direction or guidance presented and the presence or absence of working examples, but also the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art and the predictability or unpredictability of the art. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This enablement requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is separate and distinct from the written description requirement of that provision. See, e.g., Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc) (“Since its inception, this court has consistently held that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from enablement.”)

Angstadt, In re, 537 F.2d 498, 190 USPQ 214 (CCPA 1976) . . . 2164.01, 2164.06, 2164.08(b)

Vaeck, In re, 947 F.2d 448, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . 2107.01, 2144.08, 2164.01, 2164.01(c), 2164.03, 2164.06(b), 2164.08

1727 Ex Parte MATSUI et al 11/979,403 HASTINGS 103(a) MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP EXAMINER ARCIERO, ADAM A

1781 Ex Parte Nelson et al 11/370,137 KATZ 103(a) 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY EXAMINER AMAKWE, TAMRA L

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2168 Ex Parte Rigoutsos 10/305,582 DIXON 101/102(b)/103(a) RYAN, MASON & LEWIS, LLP EXAMINER LY, CHEYNE D

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2443 Ex Parte Ruiz et al 10/408,037 SIU 103(a) Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC EXAMINER NGUYEN, PHUOC H

2600 Communications
2611 Ex Parte Felbach 10/838,234 RUGGIERO 103(a) GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C. EXAMINER NEFF, MICHAEL R

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3711 Ex Parte Theel 10/668,049 KIM 103(a) LAW OFFICES OF CLEMENT CHENG EXAMINER HYLINSKI, ALYSSA MARIE

3711 Ex Parte Turnpaugh et al 11/619,744 PER CURIAM 103(a) MYERS BIGEL SIBLEY & SAJOVEC, P. A. EXAMINER BLAU, STEPHEN LUTHER

3737 Ex Parte Ritter et al 09/842,417 HORNER 102(b) Bryan K. Wheelock Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C. EXAMINER CASLER, BRIAN L

clement, mostafazadeh, north american container, clement, ariad

REVERSED

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3768 Ex Parte Rubin et al 10/341,526 MILLS 103(a) MARTIN D. MOYNIHAN d/b/a PRTSI, INC. EXAMINER JUNG, UNSU
AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1627 Ex Parte Tamura et al 11/783,590 PRATS 251/103(a) FOLEY AND LARDNER LLP EXAMINER WANG, SHENGJUN

The recapture rule “prevents a patentee from regaining through reissue the subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to obtain allowance of the original claims.” In re Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468.

Application of the recapture rule is a three step process. . . . The first step is to determine whether and in what aspect the reissue claims are broader than the patent claims. . . . [A] reissue claim that deletes a limitation or element from the patent claims is broader with respect to the modified limitation. . . . Next, the court must determine whether the broader aspects of the reissue claims relate to surrendered subject matter. . . . To determine whether an applicant surrendered particular subject matter, we look to the prosecution history for arguments and changes to the claims made in an effort to overcome a prior art rejection. . . . [In] the third step of the recapture analysis . . . the court must determine whether the surrendered subject matter has crept into the reissue claim.

In re Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

“In discussing this third step, it is important to distinguish among the original claims (i.e., the claims before the surrender), the patented claims (i.e., the claims allowed after surrender), and the reissue claims.” Id. Thus, “recapture may be avoided under this final step of the analysis if the reissue claims "materially narrow" the claims relative to the original claims such that full or substantial recapture of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution is avoided.” Id. (quoting N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

However, “if the reissue claim is as broad as or broader [than the canceled or amended claim] in an aspect germane to a prior art rejection, but narrower in another aspect completely unrelated to the rejection, the recapture rule bars the claim . . . .” In re Clement, 131 F.3d at 1470.

Clement, In re, 131 F.3d 1464, 45 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . 1412.02

North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 75 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . 1412.02

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3616 Ex Parte Szymanski et al 10/947,077 BAHR 112(1)/102(b)/103(a) THE WEBB LAW FIRM, P.C. EXAMINER ILAN, RUTH

In effect, Appellants’ Specification and claims merely recite a description of a problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it, covering all potential joints/linkages and sensor configurations later invented and determined to fall within the claims’ functional boundaries. This is not sufficient to satisfy the description requirement. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that a sufficient description of a genus requires disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus to permit one of skill in the art to “‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus”).

capon, ariad, CFMT

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1612 Ex Parte Platz et al 11/536,348 ADAMS 103(a) NOVARTIS EXAMINER KISHORE, GOLLAMUDI S

1655 Ex Parte Chern et al 11/999,637 FREDMAN 112(1) Cozen O'Connor EXAMINER MI, QIUWEN

“[T]he determination of what is needed to support generic claims to biological subject matter depends on a variety of factors, such as the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, the predictability of the aspect at issue, and other considerations appropriate to the subject matter.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 76 USPQ2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . .2163
In Ariad, the court found that the written description “doctrine never created a heightened requirement to provide a nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of the entire genus of claimed genetic material; it has always expressly permitted the disclosure of structural features common to the members of the genus.” Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2169 Ex Parte Thusoo 10/662,095 ZECHER 103(a) HICKMAN PALERMO TRUONG & BECKER/ORACLE EXAMINER BETIT, JACOB F

2600 Communications
2618 Ex Parte Weber et al 11/559,382 MACDONALD 102(e)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 103(a) Paradigm IP Law, PC EXAMINER TRINH, TAN H

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3633 Ex Parte Pierson et al 11/100,145 SAINDON 102(b)/103(a) FAY SHARPE LLP EXAMINER A, PHI DIEU TRAN

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3732 Ex Parte Pernot et al 10/580,373 BAHR 103(a) Gary M Cohen EXAMINER WILSON, JOHN J

3761 Ex Parte Venkitaraman et al 11/128,579 HORNER 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY EXAMINER TREYGER, ILYA Y
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3781 Ex Parte Hall et al 10/418,925 PRATS 102(b) 102(b)/103(a) Evans & Dixon, LLC EXAMINER SMALLEY, JAMES N
AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1654 Ex Parte Aoki et al 10/461,829 SCHEINER 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 103(a) STEPHEN DONOVAN ALLERGAN, INC. EXAMINER GUPTA, ANISH

“Enablement does not require an inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace. Title 35 does not require that a patent disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect.” CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int ’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 68 USPQ2d 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2164

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2116 Ex Parte Leech et al 11/045,965 BARRY 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER DU, THUAN N

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2431 Ex Parte Romines et al 11/086,183 BROCKETTI 103(a) Law Office of Jim Boice EXAMINER SU, SARAH

2455 Ex Parte Rosenstock et al 10/676,744 DANG 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. EXAMINER LAZARO, DAVID R

2455 Ex Parte Rosenstock et al 10/676,746 DANG 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. EXAMINER LAZARO, DAVID R

3600 Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security, and License & Review
3653 Ex Parte Jones et al 09/967,232 SAINDON 112(2)/103(a) CUMMINS-ALLISON CORP. C/O NIXON PEABODY LLP EXAMINER SHAPIRO, JEFFERY A
REHEARING

DENIED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1643 Ex Parte King et al 10/731,759 MILLS 103(a) COZEN O'CONNOR, P.C. EXAMINER SANG, HONG

arkley, purdue pharma, ariad

REVERSED

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1732 Ex Parte Thomsen et al 11/583,135 NAGUMO 102(b)/103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC EXAMINER LI, JUN

Anticipation does not, however, lie where it is necessary to pick and choose among various disclosures to find a description of the later-claimed invention. In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587-88 (CCPA 1972)

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2444 Ex Parte Loda 10/082,958 SIU 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 112(2) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C. c/o CPA Global EXAMINER BENGZON, GREG C

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1788 Ex Parte Tysoe et al 10/672,623 PAK 102(e) GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER EXAMINER LE, HOA T

2600 Communications
2614 Ex Parte Creamer et al 10/740,701 HOFF 103(a) International Business Machines Corporation CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG EXAMINER TRAN, QUOC DUC

2618 Ex Parte Martino 10/947,853 WHITEHEAD, JR. 112(1)/103(a) Law Office of Scott C Harris Inc EXAMINER NGUYEN, SIMON

"[O]ne cannot disclose a forest in the original application, and then later pick a tree out of the forest and say here is my invention." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc. 230 F.3d 1320, 1326 (2000) Rather the specification must provide some guides or "blade marks" that disclose the claimed invention "specifically, as something applicants actually invented." Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 56 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . . . . .2163, 2163.05 AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1623 Ex Parte Antrim et al 11/184,989 MILLS 112(2)/102(b)/103(a)/obviousness-type double patenting FITCH, EVEN, TABIN & FLANNERY EXAMINER BLAND, LAYLA D

1627 Ex Parte Salamone et al 11/391,060 ADAMS 103(a) Bausch & Lomb Incorporated EXAMINER HUANG, GIGI GEORGIANA

1643 Ex Parte Swetledge 11/493,651 ADAMS 103(a) LITMAN LAW OFFICES, LTD. EXAMINER HARRIS, ALANA M

2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2113 Ex Parte Deaton 10/949,041 DANG 102(b) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED EXAMINER MCCARTHY, CHRISTOPHER S

2188 Ex Parte Beuten et al 10/633,113 POTHIER 103(a) KENYON & KENYON LLP EXAMINER CHERY, MARDOCHEE

2600 Communications
2624 Ex Parte Foo et al 11/018,264 RUGGIERO 103(a) MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC EXAMINER STREGE, JOHN B

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2871 Ex Parte Aufderheide et al 10/686,141 WHITEHEAD, JR. 103(a) 3M INNOVATIVE PROPERTIES COMPANY EXAMINER RUDE, TIMOTHY L

2885 Ex Parte Cleaver et al 10/771,174 KOHUT 103(a) FITCH EVEN TABIN & FLANNERY EXAMINER SAWHNEY, HARGOBIND
REHEARING

DENIED

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2833 Ex Parte Verdon et al 11/424,046 MANTIS MERCADER 103(a) GRIFFIN & SZIPL, PC EXAMINER COLLINS, JASON M

NEW

REVERSED

2444 Ex Parte Loda 10/082,958 SIU 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 112(2) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C. c/o CPA Global EXAMINER BENGZON, GREG C

2451 Ex Parte Nirkhe et al 10/017,469 DIXON 103(a) LEE & HAYES, PLLC EXAMINER DINH, KHANH Q

REEXAMINATION

REHEARING DENIED

2617 Ex Parte AVID IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS, INC. 90/008,702 5,499,017 SIU dissent TORCZON 102(b)/103(a) Patent Owner DLA PIPER US LLP Third Party Requesters Marger Johnson & McCollom PC EXAMINER PEIKARI, BEHZAD original EXAMINER SWANN III, GLEN R

AFFIRMED

1638 Ex Parte Abad et al 11/982,700 GRIMES 102(b)/102(e)/112(1) Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner/ Monsanto EXAMINER KUMAR, VINOD

1762 Ex Parte Correll et al 11/114,336 GARRIS 102(b) AKZO NOBEL INC. EXAMINER NERANGIS, VICKEY MARIE

3627 Ex Parte Emde et al 11/323,954 DESHPANDE 103(a) SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A. EXAMINER HAIDER, FAWAAD

2432 Ex Parte Hori 09/947,547 NAPPI 102(e) WESTERMAN, HATTORI, DANIELS & ADRIAN, LLP EXAMINER LANIER, BENJAMIN E

2432 Ex Parte Kim et al 10/128,839 SMITH 103(a) EXAMINER BARRON JR, GILBERTO

boehringer, stencel, Jung, tiffin, joy technologies, huang, cable, standish, ariad, reiffin, lockwood, barker, vas-cath

REVERSED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1633 Ex Parte Thastrup et al 10/072,036 GREEN 102(b)/103(a)/112(1) Workman Nydegger EXAMINER BURKHART, MICHAEL D
1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering
1798 Ex Parte Desai et al 10/288,126 TIMM 112(1)/102(e)/102(b)/103(a)/112(1) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY EXAMINER COLE, ELIZABETH M
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2183 Ex Parte Cabillic et al 11/186,036 JEFFERY 112(1)/102(b)/103(a) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED EXAMINER FAHERTY, COREY S
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2424 Ex Parte Kim 10/216,875 BAUMEISTER 102(b)/112(1) 112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) SUGHRUE MION, PLLC EXAMINER SHANG, ANNAN Q

2451 Ex Parte McDougall et al 10/284,966 MacDONALD 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER DIVECHA, KAMAL B

2600 Communications
2629 Ex Parte Lilleness et al 10/287,337 KRIVAK 102(b)/103(a) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP (CHI) EXAMINER PHAM, TAMMY T

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
2876 Ex Parte Robinson et al 11/265,364 MANTIS MERCADER 102(e)/102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER SHARIFZADA, ALI R

AFFIRMED

1600 Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
1654 Ex Parte Krafft et al 11/100,212 GRIMES 102(b) Jane Massey Licata, Esquire Licata & Tyrrell P.C. EXAMINER GUPTA, ANISH
2100 Computer Architecture and Software
2175 Ex Parte Muller et al 11/040,270 COURTENAY 102(b) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP EXAMINER TANK, ANDREW L

We also broadly but reasonably construe the “configured to render an arrangement . . . .” language of claim 1 as a statement of intended use or purpose. (emphasis added) “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim's preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id.

Stencel, In re, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2111.02
...
See In re Jung, No. 2010-1019, 2011 WL 1235093 at 7 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(“Jung argues that the Board gave improper deference to the examiner’s rejection by requiring Jung to‘identif[y] a reversible error’ by the examiner, which improperly shifted the burden of proving patentability onto Jung. Decision at 11. This is a hollow argument, because, as discussed above, the examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation and the burden was properly shifted to Jung to rebut it. . . . ‘[R]eversible error’ means that the applicant must identify to the Board what the examiner did wrong . . . .”).

2192 Ex Parte Bagley et al 10/852,908 BARRY 103(a) CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & PAUL, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG EXAMINER BUI, HANH THI MINH
2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security
2432 Ex Parte Wang et al 10/026,043 MacDONALD 103(a) MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. EXAMINER KIM, JUNG W
2600 Communications
2612 Ex Parte Lindskog 10/502,018 SAADAT 103(a) Mark P. Stone EXAMINER NGUYEN, NAM V
3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design
3721 Ex Parte Bodine et al 10/943,795 O’NEILL 103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. EXAMINER DURAND, PAUL R

Objective evidence of non-obviousness, including commercial success, must be commensurate in scope with the claims. In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791 (CCPA 197 1) (evidence showing commercial success of thermoplastic foam “cups” used in vending machines was not commensurate in scope with claims directed to thermoplastic foam “containers” broadly). In order to be commensurate in scope with the claims, the commercial success must be due to claimed features, and not due to unclaimed features. Joy Technologies Inc. v. Manbeck, 751 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Features responsible for commercial success were recited only in allowed dependent claims, and therefore the evidence of commercial success was not commensurate in scope with the broad claims at issue.). An inventor’s opinion as to the purchaser’s reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus between the sales and the claimed invention. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Further, gross sales figures do not show commercial success absent evidence as to market share, Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or as to the time period during which the product was sold, or as to what sales would normally be expected in the market, Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454, 1458 (BPAI 1988).

Tiffin, In re, 443 F.2d 394, 170 USPQ 88 (CCPA 1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716.04, 2142

Joy Technologies Inc. v. Manbeck, 751 F. Supp 225, 17 USPQ2d 1257 (D.D.C. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . .716.03(a)

Huang, In re, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . 716.03, 716.03(b), 2145

Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 226 USPQ 881 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . 716.03(b), 716.06, 1504.03

Standish, Ex parte, 10 USPQ2d 1454 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) .716.03(a), 716.03(b), 2138.01
3738 Ex Parte Calandruccio et al 10/842,030 BAHR 103(a) WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC. EXAMINER PRONE, CHRISTOPHER D

3772 Ex Parte Masini 10/872,717 O’NEILL 112(1)/102(e)/102(b)/103(a) GIFFORD, KRASS, SPRINKLE, ANDERSON & CITKOWSKI, P.C EXAMINER PATEL, TARLA R

[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. . . . [T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed. . . . This inquiry . . . is a question of fact.

Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(en banc) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). See also Vas-Cath at 1563-64.

New or amended claims which introduce elements or limitations which are not supported by the as-filed disclosure violate the written description requirement. Written description support can be either express or inherent, and is determined from the disclosure considered as a whole. Reiffin v. Microsoft, 214 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). That one of ordinary skill in the art might see the scenario asserted by Appellant as possible within the context of the description in Appellant’s Specification is insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and In re Wohnsiedler, 315 F.2d 934, 937 (CCPA 1963). See also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (CCPA 1977):

That a person skilled in the art might realize from reading the disclosure that such a step is possible is not a sufficient indication to that person that [the] step is part of appellants’ invention. Such an indication is the least that is required for a description of the invention under the first paragraph of § 112.

Precisely how close the original description must come to comply with the description requirement must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The primary consideration is factual and depends on the nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in the art by the disclosure. See Vas-Cath at 1561-63.

Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 USPQ2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991). . .1504.20, 2161, 2163, 2163.02, 2164, 2181

Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1505, 41 USPQ2d 1961 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . 2133.03(a), 2163, 2163.02

Barker, In re, 559 F.2d 588, 194 USPQ 470 (CCPA 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2161, 2163

ariad, rowe, texas instruments

REVERSED 

1700 Chemical & Materials Engineering 

Ex Parte Murphy et al 10989721 COLAIANNI 103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYDE, P.C. EXAMINER MCDONALD, RODNEY GLENN 

Ex Parte Tsai et al 10382032 PAK 103(a) PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP - - APPM/TX EXAMINER ZHENG, LOIS L 

Ex Parte Maydan et al 10867591 COLAIANNI 103(a) MOSER IS LAW GROUP APPLIED MATERIALS, INC. EXAMINER KUNEMUND, ROBERT M 

Ex Parte Burns et al 11108274 COLAIANNI 112(1)/103(a) FLETCHER YODER (CHEVRON PHILLIPS) EXAMINER CHEUNG, WILLIAM K 

As stated in Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,

the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. . . . The term "possession," however, has never been very enlightening. It implies that as long as one can produce records documenting a written description of a claimed invention, one can show possession. But the hallmark of written description is disclosure. Thus, "possession as shown in the disclosure" is a more complete formulation. Yet whatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.

598 F. 3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

Ex Parte Bernard et al 10873887 SMITH 103(a) PITNEY BOWES INC. EXAMINER NORDMEYER, PATRICIA L 

2100 Computer Architecture and Software 

Ex Parte Mane et al 10654137 JEFFERY 103(a) NOVAK DRUCE & QUIGG, LLP EXAMINER LIN, SHEW FEN 

Ex Parte Robinson et al 10633804 BLANKENSHIP 103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER KIM, PAUL 

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security 

Ex Parte Nakaoka et al 09958885 MARTIN 103(a) OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC EXAMINER NANO, SARGON N 

2600 Communications 

Ex Parte Linzer 11122426 MANTIS MERCADER 103(a) CHRISTOPHER P MAIORANA, PC LSI CORPORATION EXAMINER CHOW, JEFFREY J 

Ex Parte Turetzky et al 10154138 MANTIS MERCADER 103(a) THE ECLIPSE GROUP LLP EXAMINER PEREZ, ANGELICA 

Ex Parte Endoh et al 10239188 SAADAT 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLANDMAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. EXAMINER AGUSTIN, PETER VINCENT 

Ex Parte Shiono 10882316 MANTIS MERCADER 103(a) MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC EXAMINER HSU, JONI 

2800 Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components 

Ex Parte Lee et al 11033845 SAADAT 102(b)/103(a) HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C. EXAMINER ARORA, AJAY 

Ex Parte Iwamoto et al 10543051 KERINS 103(a)/112(1)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG EXAMINER CULLER, JILL E 

Ex Parte Tsukagoshi 10796394 HAIRSTON 103(a) SEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP PLLC EXAMINER LAVARIAS, ARNEL C 

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design 

Ex Parte Joye et al 10867986 McCARTHY 112(1)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRATT & STEINKRAUS, P.A. EXAMINER PEFFLEY, MICHAEL F 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART 

2100 Computer Architecture and Software 

Ex Parte Hathaway 10636128 SIU 102(e) Siemens Corporation EXAMINER THERIAULT, STEVEN B 

2400 Networking, Mulitplexing, Cable, and Security 

Ex Parte Lubbers et al 10043924 BARRETT 102(e) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY EXAMINER TANG, KAREN C 

2600 Communications 

Ex Parte Adams et al 11191006 HAHN 101/102(b) OGILVY RENAULT LLP EXAMINER RAMPURIA, SHARAD K 

Ex Parte Joshi et al 11251674 WHITEHEAD, JR. 103(a) MOTOROLA, INC EXAMINER THIER, MICHAEL 

3700 Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, and Products & Design 

Ex Parte Mutchler 10761185 McCARTHY 102(b)/103(a) JOHNSON & JOHNSON EXAMINER CUMBERLEDGE, JERRY 

REEXAMINATION 

inter parties

EXAMINER AFFIRMED 

3900 Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) SHIMANO, INC. Requester and Respondent v. ROLF DIETRICH Patent Owner and Appellant 95000008 6,428,113 LEBOVITZ 120 Priority/112(1)/103(a)/305 314(a) Enlarging the scope of the claims PURDUE LAW OFFICES THIRD PARTY REQUESTER David L. Tarnoof Global IP Counselors, LLP EXAMINER ENGLISH, PETER C 

When a claim term merely states a purpose, an intended use, or a result, the term may not be considered a limitation of the claim. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 42 USPQ2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.02, 2303 

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 26 USPQ2d 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716.04